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Abstract 
Penetration testing involves performing a controlled attack on a computer system in order 
to assess it’s security. It is currently one of the key methods employed by organizations for 
strengthening their defences against cyber threats. However, network penetration testing requires 
a significant amount of training and time to perform well and presently there is a growing 
shortage of skilled cyber security professionals. One avenue for trying to solve this problem is to 
apply Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to the cyber security domain in order to automate 
the penetration testing process. Current approaches to automated penetration testing have relied 
on methods which require a model of the exploit outcomes, however the cyber security 
landscape is rapidly changing as new software and attack vectors are developed which makes 
producing and maintaining up-to-date models a challenge. To try and address the need for 
exploit models this project investigated the application of Reinforcement Learning (RL) to 
automated penetration testing. RL is an AI optimization technique that has the key advantage 
that it does not require a model of the environment in order to produce an attack policy, and 
instead learns the best policy through interaction with the environment. In the first stage of this 
study we  designed and built a fast, light-weight and open-source network attack simulator that 
can be used to train and test autonomous agents for penetration testing. We did this by framing 
penetration testing as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with the known configuration of the 
network as states, the available scans and exploits as actions, the reward determined by the value 
of machines on the network and using non-deterministic actions to model the outcomes of scans 
and exploits against machines. In the second stage of the project we used the network attack 
simulator to investigate the application of RL to penetration testing. We tested the standard 
Q-learning RL algorithm using both tabular and neural network based implementations. We 
found that within the simulated environment both tabular and neural network RL algorithms 
were able to find optimal attack paths for a range of different network topologies and sizes given 
only knowledge of the network topology and the set of available scans and exploits. This finding 
provided some justification for the use of RL for penetration testing. However, the implemented 
algorithms were only practical for smaller networks and numbers of actions and would not be 
able to scale to truly large networks, so there is still much room for improvement. This study was 
the first that the authors are aware of that has applied reinforcement learning to automated 
penetration testing. The versatility of RL to solving MDPs where the model is unknown, lends 
itself well to the changing nature of cyber security and could offer a valuable tool for reducing 
the workload on a cyber security professionals. Further work into developing scalable RL 
algorithms and testing these algorithms in higher fidelity simulators will be the next steps 
required before RL is ready to be applied in commercial environments. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The increasing interconnection of the digital world via the use of the internet has changed the 
way businesses, governments and individuals operate and has lead to significant economic and 
social benefits ​[1]​. This improved communication and availability, however, has also created 
more opportunities for cyber criminals to launch malicious attacks in the hopes of gaining access 
to sensitive data for their own gain ​[1]​. These attacks can range in scale from massive 
state-sponsored attacks, such as the attempts to disrupt the US election, to simple attacks on 
individuals in the hopes of gaining password or credit card details for monetary gain ​[2], [3]​. As 
more organisations and individuals come to rely on globally connected computer systems the 
ability to secure these systems against malicious attacks is becoming ever more important.  
Cyber Security, which is the safeguarding of computer systems against unauthorized 
access or attack, is now a matter of global importance and interest ​[4]​. Many nations have 
official policies in place regarding cyber security and some are investing significant amounts into 
the domain ​[4]​. The Australian government only recently announced it will invest $50 million 
into cyber security research over the next seven years ​[5]​. This increased focus and investment 
by governments and large organization emphasizes the serious threat cyber crimes pose for 
businesses, governments and individuals. It is important that effective methods and technologies 
are developed for securing computer systems against these threats. 
One of the most commonly applied methods for evaluating the security of a computer 
system is penetration testing (pentesting). Pentesting involves performing an authorized 
controlled attack on a system in order to find any security vulnerabilities that could be exploited 
by an attacker ​[6], [7]​. This method can be very effective for evaluating a systems security since 
it is essentially a simulation of what real world attackers would do in practice. This effectiveness, 
however, comes with one main drawback which is that it has a high cost in terms of time and 
skills required to perform it. This high cost is becoming more of an issue as digital systems 
grown in size, complexity and quantity which is causing a demand for security professionals, a 
demand that is not being met fast enough. In 2015 Cisco, one of the world's leading IT and 
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networking companies, estimated there were more than 1 million unfilled security jobs 
worldwide ​[8]​. Given this shortage of professionals and the necessity for pentesting in securing 
systems it is becoming crucial that tools and methods are developed for making pentesting more 
efficient. 
Presently, a number of tools have been developed that facilitate penetration testers and 
help improve their efficiency. These tools include network and vulnerability scanners as well as 
libraries of known security vulnerabilities ​[8]​. One of the most popular tools today is the open 
source Metasploit framework which has been in development since 2003 ​[8]​. The Metasploit 
framework contains a rich library of known exploits of system vulnerabilities along with other 
useful tools such as scanners, which are used for information gathering on a target. Tools such as 
these allow the pentester to work at a higher level of abstraction where they are mainly focussed 
on finding vulnerabilities and selecting exploits rather than having to work at the low level of 
manually developing exploits. This enables pentesters to work faster and also makes security 
assessment more accessible to non-experts ​[9]​. These tools have certainly been a boon to the 
cyber security industry, however, even with the great benefits these tools have provided they still 
rely on trained user, which are in short supply. Additionally, as systems grow in complexity the 
task of manually assessing security will become much harder to do systematically. 
One approach to trying to solve the problem of conducting efficient and reliable 
pentesting is to apply techniques from the Artificial Intelligence (AI) planning domain to 
pentesting in order to automate the process. The original concept for this took the form of “attack 
graphs”, which modeled an existing computer network as a graph of connected computers, where 
attacks can then be simulated on the network using known vulnerabilities and exploits ​[10]​. 
Attack graphs can be effective in learning the possible ways an attacker can breach a system, 
however using these graphs requires complete knowledge of the system, which is unrealistic 
from a real world attackers point of view, and also require the manual construction of the attack 
graph for each system being assessed. Another approach taken involved modelling an attack on a 
computer as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) ​[11], [12]​. Modelling an 
attack as a POMDP introduces the attackers incomplete knowledge into the simulation and 
allows simulations to remove the assumption that the configuration of each host is known and 
instead models the observation of the configurations as the attack progresses. This approach can 
work well in practice against a single host machine but due to the computational properties of 
POMDPs, does not scale well ​[12]​. In order to produce a method for automating pentesting that 
can handle the uncertainty inherent in any system while still being computationally feasible more 
research into novel methods is required. 
A proposed solution to this problem is to simulate pentesting using an MDP. This 
approach would ignore the uncertainty about the state of the host computer's configuration and 
instead introduce the uncertainty into the success probability of each possible attack ​[13]​. This 
type of model is computationally more feasible than the POMDP approach and does not require 
complete knowledge of the network and host configurations. However, it requires prior 
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knowledge about the success probabilities of each possible action and it treats each target 
computer as exactly the same instead of utilizing information gathered about the target to 
produce more tailored attacks. Consequently, this approach addresses the issues of computational 
complexity and incomplete knowledge of network and host configurations but at the cost of 
accuracy of picking the best actions for each host. 
Another approach for solving problems that can be framed as a MDP that does not 
require information about the transition model of the environment is Reinforcement Learning 
(RL) ​[14]​. RL requires only the state space representation, the set of actions that can be 
performed and a reward function which defines what the RL agent is trying to achieve. The agent 
then learns a policy of actions to take from any given state through interaction with its 
environment. The use of RL has gained a lot of attention in recent years with its use in producing 
World Go champion beating agents ​[15]​, and although not as widely applied as other supervised 
machine learning approaches it has been successfully applied in the real world for in a number of 
robotics tasks ​[16]​. RL provides a more general approach when a detailed model of the 
environment is not known.  
In terms of automating penetration testing, we have information on the set actions that 
can be performed,  and can frame the task into a reward function. However, due to the complex 
and ever changing nature of the cyber network environment, with constant updates to software 
and available exploits it becomes very difficult to maintain an accurate up-to-date model for the 
outcomes of performing any action. This combination sets RL as a good candidate approach for 
automated pentesting. However, RL offers its own challenges. It’s generality comes at the cost of 
requiring a large amount of data in order to learn the best policy of actions. This data is typically 
gained from using simulations in order to train the RL agent. 
In this study we aimed to investigate the use of RL in automated pentesting. The first part 
of the project was to develop a network attack simulator that can be used for testing and training 
of automated pentesting agents and algorithms. The second part of the study was to investigate 
the use of  RL algorithms to finding policies for penetration testing in a simulated environment. 
In this thesis, in chapter 2 we provide details on the current state of automated penetration 
testing and some background information useful for the later chapters of the thesis. Chapter 3 
covers the rationale, design and implementation of the network attack simulator. In chapter 4 we 
provide a report on my investigation of using RL for automated penetration testing. Finally, 
chapter 5 provides a brief summary and conclusion of the the study and some directions for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
 
2.1 Penetration testing 
 
Pentesting has been around for more than four decades and is a critical process in the 
development of secure cyber systems ​[17]​. It involves performing a controlled attack on a piece 
of software or a network in order to evaluate its security. The process of pentesting, when 
applied to a network, is typically divided into a sequence of steps in order to methodically assess 
the given system (fig. 2.1.1). The specific steps can vary from attack to attack but generally a 
penetration test will first involve ​information gathering​, where the aim is to find a vulnerability 
(a flaw in the system) in the network, followed by ​attack and penetration ​where the discovered 
vulnerability is exploited and then, lastly, using the newly gained access to repeat this process 
until the desired target is reached ​[9]​. The information gathering step typically involves utilising 
tools such as traffic monitoring, port scanning and operating system (OS) detection in order to 
collect relevant information that can be used to determine if the system contains a vulnerability 
that can be exploited. The attack and penetrate phase involves executing a known ​exploit​, which 
can be a program or certain data, to take advantage of the discovered vulnerability and to cause 
unintended behaviour in the system with the ultimate aim of compromising the target and 
gaining privileged access to it. Once a successful attack is performed the specific sequence of 
attack actions can then be reported and used by system administrators and developers to fix the 
vulnerabilities. Even though the systems and networks that are evaluated using pentesting can 
differ immensely, in each case the same general steps are followed. This has allowed for the 
development of a number of tools and frameworks to help make pentesting more efficient. 
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Figure 2.1.1 | The main steps of a penetration test​​ ​[9]​. 
 
2.2 Tools used for penetration testing 
 
The cyber security industry is a very large and active community where there are numerous tools 
that exist to aid in pentesting, here we will mainly focus on the most commonly used tools for 
network pentesting. For the information gathering stage the aim is to find useful information 
about the network, this is typically done using a network scanner, with the best know network 
scanner being Nmap (​www.nmap.org​) ​[18], [19]​.  Nmap provides the user with information such 
as OS, open ports and services currently running on the system. This information can then be 
used to check for any vulnerabilities in the system using vulnerability scanners such as Nessus 
(​www.tenable.com/nessus/professional​) and, the free alternative, OpenVAS (​www.openvas.org​). 
These scanners can be used to determine if a vulnerability exists but in order to test the 
vulnerability an exploit needs to be used.  
Once information about vulnerabilities on  system have been gathered, this is where 
pentesting frameworks such as Metasploit (​www.metasploit.com​) are used. The Metasploit 
software is a collection of tools and exploits that can be used from a single environment ​[18]​. 
Metasploit is an open source project that was started in 2003 and was purchased by Rapid7 in 
2009 and is regularly updated with new exploits and tools. The user can use information gathered 
during the information gathering stage to search for and launch exploits from the Metasploit 
software, allowing the user to focus on the tactical operation (which exploit to launch) rather 
than technical level (how to find and develop an exploit). This automation at the technical level 
allows for a huge increase in efficiency during pentesting.  
The tools now available to pentesters have had great benefits in terms of improved 
efficiency, however, it still requires a non-trivial amount of expertise and time to execute a 
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successful pentest. With the growing demand for security experts new approaches are necessary 
to ensure security evaluation demands can be met. 
2.2 Automated pentesting: attack graphs 
 
The idea of pentesting automation has been around for many years with the original approaches 
taking the form of ​attack graphs​ ​[10]​.​ ​Attack graphs are used to model systems and how they are 
affected by specific exploits. In an attack graph, the nodes are typically the state of a system, 
where the state is defined by the current system configuration (i.e. OS, permissions, network 
connections, etc) and the edges connecting the nodes are known exploits ​[20]​. Once this graph is 
constructed it becomes possible to search for sequences of attacker actions (exploits), known as 
an an ​attack paths​, that lead to the attacker gaining unintended access to the system.​ ​Finding 
these attack paths can be done using classical AI planning techniques ​[21]​.​ ​The main issue with 
this approach is that it requires complete knowledge of the network topology and each machines 
configuration, so is not realistic from an attackers point of view, and also requires manually 
setting up the graph for each new system being evaluated. 
 
2.3 Automated pentesting: using MDP 
 
Another approach to modelling and planning attacks against a system is to use a Markov 
Decision Process (MDP) to simulate the environment ​[13], [22]​. A MDP is a general framework 
for modeling discrete decision making problems under uncertainty ​[23]​. When defining an MDP 
we do so over the tuple {​𝓢, 𝓐, 𝓡, 𝓣​}, where ​𝓢  ​is the state space, ​𝓐 ​ is the action space, ​𝓣​ is the 
transition function ​𝓣 (s, a, s’) = P (s’| s,a)​ and ​𝓡 ​ is the reward function ​𝓡 (s, a).​ At each time 
step the system will be in some state, ​s ∈ 𝓢, ​ and the agent will perform some action, ​a ∈ 𝓐, 
resulting in two things: (1) a transition to a new state ​s’,​ where the new state is determined by the 
transition function ​𝓣​, (2) a reward as determined by the reward function, ​𝓡 ​. The aim of an agent 
attempting to solve a MDP is to find the optimal mapping from ​𝓢 ​to ​𝓐​ so as to maximize the 
total accumulated reward. This mapping is known as the decision policy π. 
When applied to pentesting the state space of the MDP becomes the possible 
configurations of the target machines or of the network, the actions are the possible exploits or 
scans available and the reward will be based on the cost of an action and the value gained when 
successfully compromising a system. 
So far there has been limited application of MDPs to automated pentesting. One approach 
that has been used is to ignore the configuration of the target system entirely and instead rely on 
formulating the attackers uncertainty in the form of possible action outcomes ​[13]​. Attacks are 
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then planned based on the attack success probabilities, where each action receives a probability 
of success based on prior knowledge of the given action ​[13]​. In this form it is essentially adding 
some non-determinism to an attack graph representation of a system. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it allows for modelling of attacker 
uncertainty while still being computationally feasible to solve.​ ​However, this approach does not 
take into account known knowledge about the configuration of a system, which is a key step in 
effective penetration testing, and instead treats all machines as identical. Additionally, it also 
requires some prior knowledge of the attack outcome probabilities (the transition model) before 
it can be used and these probabilities can vary widely depending on the systems it is being used 
against (e.g. Windows or Linux) and will change over time as new software and exploits are 
developed. 
 
2.4 Automated pentesting: modelling uncertainty with 
POMDP 
 
Another approach to automating pentesting aimed to address the assumption of full network 
knowledge required for attack graphs while still accounting for the uncertainty of the attacker by 
is to model the pentesting problem as a POMDP ​[12]​.  
A POMDP, or partially observable markov decision process, is a MDP in which there is 
uncertainty about the exact state the system is in and so it models the current state as a 
probability distribution over all possible states ​[24]​. POMDPs are typically defined by a tuple 
{​𝓢, 𝓐, Ω, 𝓣,𝓞, 𝓡, b​o​} where ​𝓢, 𝓐, 𝓣 ​and ​𝓡​ are the same as in an MDP, while ​Ω ​is the 
observation space, ​𝓞 ​ is the observation function ​𝓞 (s’, a, o) = P (o|s’,a) ​ and ​b ​o​ ​is the initial 
probability distribution over states ​[24], [25]​. Similar to an MDP, following each time step there 
will be a transition to a new state s’ and a reward, but in addition taking a step will also result in 
an observation, ​o ∈ Ω,​ as determined by the observation function ​𝓞 ​. The aim of the problem is 
the same as for an MDP, which is to find an optimal decision policy π​*​. 
When applied to pentesting the state space of the POMDP becomes the possible 
configurations of the target machine or of the network, the actions are the possible exploits or 
scans available, the observation space is the possible information that is received when a exploit 
or scan is used (e.g. ports open, or exploit failure/success), while the reward will be based on the 
cost of an action and the value gained when successfully compromising a system ​[11], [12]​. 
Using the POMDP approach allows modelling of many relevant properties of real world hacking, 
since in a real attack the attacker would have incomplete knowledge about what the actual 
configuration of the system is and also whether certain exploits or scans will succeed. 
Additionally, it also means that the same automated pentesting approach can be used to test a 
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system even if the system changes since knowledge of the exact system configuration is not 
assumed ​[11]​. This differs when compared to attack graphs which would need to be updated 
every time something in the system is changed.  
Sarraute et al. ​[12]​ implemented this approach using a POMDP in a simplified simulated 
network environment where the aim of the attack was to penetrate the system in order to reach a 
number of sensitive machines on the network. The approach was able to learn to intelligently 
mix scans and exploits and was tested on networks of varying size. Whether this approach 
performed better than the classical planning approach using attack graphs was uncertain but it 
definitely had the advantage of no assumed knowledge of the system configurations.  
The POMDP approach is promising in that it more accurately models the real world 
attacker, however, it has one critical issue in that POMDP based solvers do not scale very well 
and quickly become computationally infeasible as the size of the state space grows. In the 
approach by Sarraute et al. ​[11], [12]​ they had to approach the network penetration test by 
decomposing the network into individual POMDPs against single target machines only. So 
although the approach was more realistic from attackers point of view it is currently 
computationally too expensive. 
 
2.5 Automated pentesting: when the world model is 
unknown 
 
Both MDP and POMDP provide a general framework for modeling the uncertainty inherent 
when performing penetration testing and have a number of techniques available for solving them. 
An MDP is the simpler version of the POMDP where the key difference is that there is no 
uncertainty about the current state of the environment (it is fully observable). The advantage of 
MDPs is that they are much more computationally tractable to solve when compared to POMDPs 
and there are many efficient algorithms for solving them ​[26]​. This improved efficiency should 
allow them to be more useful in practice. However, this efficiency does come at the cost of some 
of the ability to model uncertainty. There main form of uncertainty that remains for MDPs is the 
uncertainty relating to non-deterministic actions as dictated by the transition function, or model 
of the world. 
One technique that can be used for finding an optimal policy for a MDP is Reinforcement 
Learning (RL) ​[14]​. RL uses samples generated through interaction with the environment in 
order to optimize performance. The key advantages of RL over classical planning approaches is 
its ability to handle large environments and when a model of the environment is not known or a 
solution using the model is not available due to it being computationally intractable ​[14]​.  
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For penetration testing, due to the complex nature of computer systems it becomes a 
major challenge to create and maintain an accurate model of how exploits will affect any given 
system. This is due to the constant evolution of attacks and the systems themselves. This 
property makes pentesting a good candidate for using RL, since it is possible to define 
penetration testing as an MDP but using RL we do not require the transition model. The main 
challenge facing RL is that it requires many interactions with the environment in order to learn 
an optimal policy. This feature has lead to many of the successful applications of RL being done 
in simulated or game environments where the RL agents is able to rapidly interact with its 
surroundings ​[15], [16], [27]​.  
Presently, no freely available simulated environment exists for network penetration 
testing that can be used to train and test RL agents. This desire to apply RL to automated 
pentesting and the lack of training environment lead to the design and aims of this study. In the 
next chapter, we cover the design and implementation of a network attack simulator that can be 
used for training RL agents. Then in chapter 4 we cover the application of RL to penetration 
testing in more detail. 
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Chapter 3 
The Network Attack Simulator 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The recent improvements to AI techniques have been greatly aided by the establishment of 
well-known, freely available performance benchmarks. These benchmarks can take many forms 
depending on the application domain, for example there is the arcade learning environment for 
testing generalised Reinforcement Learning algorithms ​[28]​ and the ImageNet dataset for 
computer vision ​[29]​. ​​These benchmarks become testing grounds, allowing researchers to 
compare the performance of algorithms with each other and over time. Currently, for network 
penetration testing there exists no light-weight, freely available benchmark that can be used for 
developing automated pentesting algorithms. 
For network pentesting, for it to be realistic, a benchmark would need to take the form of 
a network simulator that allowed agents to affect the network through scans and exploits. 
Presently there are numerous widely-used and freely available network traffic simulators, such as 
NS3 ​[30]​ and mininet ​[31]​. ​​These simulators are light-weight, capable of running effectively on a 
single machine, and able to emulate network topology and traffic with high-fidelity by using a 
very minimal virtualization of an actual OS. They do not, however, allow for modeling an attack 
on the network through launching exploits and gaining access to machines and so are not suitable 
for assessing penetration testing performance. Another option is to use a network of virtual 
machines (VM). This has the advantage of having high fidelity to the real world while also being 
flexible. The main disadvantage of using a VMs is the relatively high computational cost of 
running each VM, which can slow down the training of certain types of AI algorithms such as 
RL, and also the considerable computational power required to run larger networks. The best 
system currently available appears to be the Core Insight system ​[32]​. This system operates the 
simulation at the OS level but only supports a subset of system calls, similar to the lightweight 
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network traffic simulators, in this way it is able to scale to networks of hundreds of machines on 
a single computer. However, this software is not open-source or free to the public and cost tens 
of thousands of dollars for a licence, which is out of the question for many researchers​.  
In this work, we design and build a new open-source network attack simulator (NAS). 
The NAS is designed to be easy to install with minimal dependencies and able to run fast on a 
single personal computer. It is also designed to model network pentesting at a higher level of 
abstraction in order to allow fast prototyping and testing of algorithms.  
 
3.2 Design 
 
The NAS is designed as two components. Firstly, the network, which contains all the data 
structures and logic for modeling traffic and attacks on the network. The second, is the 
environment which acts as the layer between the attacker and the network and models the 
attackers knowledge as an MDP. 
3.2.1 The network model 
The network model defines the organization, connection and configuration of machines on the 
network and is defined by the tuple ​{subnetworks, topology, machines, services, firewalls}​. An 
example network made up of five subnetworks, 11 machines and firewalls between each 
subnetwork is shown in figure 3.2.1. This network could run any number of services as this is 
defined at the level of machine. We provide more details for each component in the following 
paragraphs. This model aims to abstract away some details of a real-world network that are not 
required when developing autonomous agents such as specific types of connections between 
machines and the location of switches and routers in the network. The reason for this abstraction 
is to try and keep the simulator as simple as possible and at the level of abstraction that the agent 
is expected to work at which is determining which scans or exploits to use against which 
machine and in what order. The specific details of performing each action, for example which 
port to communicate with, are details that can be handled by application specific 
implementations when moving towards higher fidelity systems. Penetration testing is already 
moving in this direction with frameworks such as Metasploit which abstract away exactly how 
an exploit is performed and simply provide a way to find if the exploit is applicable to the 
scenario and launch it, taking care of all the lower level details of the exploit ​[18]​. This simpler 
network model is also used in order to keep it as general and easily scalable as possible. 
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Figure 3.2.1 | Example network ​​with five subnets, 11 machines and the sensitive documents located on 
machines (2, 0) and (5, 0). 
Subnetworks 
Each network is made up of multiple sub-networks or subnets. A subnet is a smaller network 
within the larger network that is composed of a group of one or more machines that are all able 
to communicate fully with each other. Each subnet has its own subnet address, which is indicated 
as the first number in any machines address (e.g. the 4 in the address (4, 0)). This is a 
simplification of IP addresses which use a 32-bit string and a seperate 32-bit subnet mask to 
define the network, subnet and machine address. For the purpose of the NAS, it makes sense to 
use a simpler system since we are only dealing with a single network as opposed to IP addresses 
which deal with millions of machines on thousands of networks across the internet. Although all 
machines within a subnet can communicate fully, communication between machines on different 
subnets is restricted. Inter-subnet communication is controlled by the network topology and 
firewall settings.  
Topology 
The network topology defines how the different subnets are connected and controls which 
subnets can communicate directly with each other and with the external network. As an example, 
in the network in figure 3.2.1 subnet 1 is the only network that is connected to the external world 
and subnets 1,  2 and 3 are all connected to each other while its only possible to communicate 
with machines on subnets 4 and 5 via a machine on subnet 3. In this way an attacker may have to 
navigate through machines on different subnets in order to be able reach the goal machines. We 
can view the network topology as an undirected graph with subnets as its vertices and 
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connections as edges. As such we can represent it using an adjacency matrix, with rows and 
columns representing the different subnets, an example matrix is as shown in figure 3.2.2​ ​​for the 
example network in figure 3.2.1. 
 
 
subnet 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
2 0 1 1 1 0 0 
3 0 1 1 1 1 1 
4 0 0 0 1 1 0 
5 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
Figure 3.2.2 | Example network topology ​​for the network in figure 3.2.1, represented using an 
adjacency matrix​.​​ Subnet 0 is used to represent the external network, while other subnets are represented 
by their ID number (i.e. 1 corresponds to subnet_1). 
 
Machines 
The most primitive building block of the network model is the machine. A machine in the NAS 
represents any device that may be connected to the network and hence be communicated with 
and exploited. Each machine is defined by its address, in the form of a (subnet_ID, machine_ID) 
tuple, it value and it’s configuration. An example machine definition can be seen in figure 3.2.3. 
The value of a machine is defined by the user with higher values given to sensitive machines, 
that is machines that the attacker wants to gain access to or that the owner wants to protect. Each 
machine runs services that can be communicated with from other machines within the same 
subnet or on neighbouring subnets, firewall permitting. The services available on each machine 
define its configuration and each machine on the network will not necessarily have the same 
configuration. This is included since not every machine on the network will be the same as some 
can be expected to be used for different purposes E.g. Web servers, file storage, user machines. 
The services present on a machine also define its points of vulnerability, since the services are 
what the attacker is aiming to exploit. 
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Figure 3.2.3 | Example machine definition on the network.​​ The example is for the 2nd machine in 
subnet 1, which has no value (i.e. not one of the goal machines) and is running ftp, ssh and http services 
running that the attacker has an exploit for. 
 
Services 
Services are used to represent any software running on a machine that communicates with the 
network. They are analogous to software that would be listening on an open port on a computer 
or connected device. Within the NAS services are considered to be the vulnerable points on any 
given machine, and can be thought of as services that have a known exploit which the attacker is 
aware of. In a real world scenario it would be the same as keeping track only of services that an 
attacker has a known exploit for, while ignoring any other non-vulnerable services. Based on this 
reasoning within the NAS, we assume each service is exploitable by one action, so the agents job 
is to find which service is running on a machine and select the correct exploit against it.  
Each service is defined by a unique ID, the probability its exploit will succeed and also 
the cost of using the exploit. Figure 3.2.3 shows an example machine in a network scenario 
where the attacker has exploits for the ftp, ssh and http services, while figure 3.2.4 shows the set 
of exploitable services and the associated success probability and cost of their exploits. The ID of 
each service can be any unique value and does not necessarily have to be a name related to a real 
world service. In this way it is easy for the NAS to generate test scenarios with any number of 
machines and services to aid in testing the scaling performance of agents by simply generating 
service IDs as needed. When investigating the application to more real world settings, the ID 
would be replaced with a specific service name and version, so it would be possible to track 
vulnerabilities and know what services require patching (e.g. Samba version 3.5.0). 
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Figure 3.2.4 | Example set of exploitable services on a network.​​ Each service definition contains a 
probability of its associated exploit working successfully and a cost for launching the exploit. 
 
Firewalls 
The final component of the network model are the firewalls that exist along the connections 
between any subnets and also between the network and the external environment. Firewalls act 
to control which services can be communicated with on machines in a given subnet from any 
other connection point outside of the subnet. They function to allow certain services to be used 
and accessed from machines within a subnet with the correct permissions, while blocking access 
to that service from unwanted entry points. Each firewall is defined by a set of rules which 
dictate which service traffic is permitted for each direction along a connection between any two 
subnets or from the external network. Figure 3.2.5 shows an example firewall that sits between 
subnets 1 and 3 and which allows access to the ssh service on machines on subnet 3 from 
machines on subnet 1 and access to ftp and http services on machines on subnet 1 from machines 
on subnet 3. In a real world setting firewall rules are typically set by defining which port can be 
accessed, however for simplicity and since for most cases the same services are run on the same 
port numbers, we have decided to instead define rules by service rather than port. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.5 | Example firewall on a network.​​ The example is for the firewall located on the connection 
between subnets 1 and 3 and defines which services are permitted in each direction. 
 
30 
 
 
 
3.2.2 The Environment 
 
The environment component of the NAS is built on top of the network model and acts as the 
interface between the attacker and the network. It is responsible for modeling the attackers 
current knowledge and position during an attack on the network. For instance it tracks 
information about which machines the attacker has successfully compromised, which machines 
they can reach and what knowledge they have about services present on each machine. Its main 
function is to control the running of an attack from the beginning, where the attacker has not yet 
interacted with the network and has no information about any machine on the network, to the end 
of the episode where the attacker either gives up or is successful in compromising the goal 
machines on the network. We model the environment component of the NAS as an MDP since 
this framework is highly versatile and a building block used by many AI algorithms. 
MDP overview 
The environment component models network pentesting problem as an MDP and as such is 
defined by the tuple ​{𝓢, 𝓐, 𝓡, 𝓣}​ (see chapter 2 for more details of MDP definitions). States are 
defined as the current knowledge and position of the attacker in the network. Actions are the 
available scans and exploits that the attacker can perform for each machine on network. The 
reward function is simply the value of any machines exploited minus the cost of actions 
performed. The transition function controls the result of any given action and takes into account 
action type, connectivity, firewalls and probabilistic nature of exploits. 
State space 
A state, ​s​ ∊ ​𝓢 ​, is defined as the collection of all known information for each machine on the 
network. That is, the state includes for each machine, if the machine is compromised or not, 
reachable or not and for each service, whether the service is present, absent or its existence is 
unknown. A machine is considered to be compromised if an exploit has successfully been used 
against it. While a machine is considered to be reachable if it is in a subnet that is publicly 
accessible (connected directly to external network), in the same subnet as a compromised 
machine or in a subnet directly connected to a subnet that contains a compromised machine. The 
state space is therefore all possible combinations of compromised, reachable and service 
knowledge for each service and for each machine. Hence, the state space grows exponentially 
with the number of machines and services on the network. Equation (3.1), shows the size 
property of the state space, ​|𝓢| ​, where ​|E| ​ is the number of exploitable services and ​|M| ​ is the 
number of machines in the network. The base of for the exponential is 3, since for each 
exploitable service the agents knowledge can have one of three values: ​present​, ​absent​ or 
unknown. 
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|𝓢 | ​∊ ​O​( 3​|E||M|​)                                                    ​(3.1) 
 
An example network and an associated state are shown in figure 3.2.6. In this state the 
attacker has successfully compromised the machine at address ​(1, 1)​ and so can now 
communicate with machines on subnets 2 and 3, which is indicated by reachable being set to ​true 
for each machine on those subnets. Additionally, the configuration of the machine at ​(3, 1)​ is 
known which would have been gained through a scan action, while the configuration for 
machine ​(2, 1)​ is ​unknown​. Note that the state does not include any information about the 
firewall settings, since this would require privileged access to determine. For this simulator we 
assume it is not possible for the attacker to gain this information and it must instead learn it 
indirectly through the success and failure of exploit actions. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.6 | Example network and state​​, where the first machine in the network has been 
compromised and machine (3, 0) has been scanned to get service information. No information has been 
gathered regarding services on machine (2, 0) 
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Action space 
The action space, ​𝓐, ​is the set of available actions within the NAS and includes a single scan 
action and an exploit for each service and each machine on the network. The scan action is 
designed to mimic the Nmap complete scan, which returns information about which services are 
running on each port of a given machine and also versions of each service ​[19]​.  In reality more 
targeted scanning may be required to discover complete information about specific services, but 
for many use cases, Nmap scans return the information required to determine which service is 
running. Scan actions are considered to be deterministic, always returning information about the 
presence or absence of a service.  
For each possible service on the network, there is a matching exploit action. Each exploit 
action can be deterministic or non-deterministic depending on the configuration of the 
environment chosen by the user. A successful exploit action will result in the target machine 
becoming compromised. The success of any exploit is determined by whether the target machine 
is reachable, the target service is present, if that service is blocked by the firewall or not and also 
the success probability of the action. 
Each action also has an associated cost which can be set when configuring the 
environment. This cost can be used to represent any metric such as the time, skill, monetary cost 
or noise generated for a given action, depending on what performance metric is trying to be 
optimized for. Figure 3.2.7, shows example scan and exploit action definitions. Both actions 
target the same machine at address ​(1, 0)​. “Action_1” is a scan with cost 1 while “Action_2” is 
an exploit for the ssh service and has a cost of 3 and a probability of success of 0.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.7 | Example scan and exploit actions​​ against machine (1, 0). Exploit is targeting the ssh 
service. 
Reward 
The reward function is used to define the goals of the autonomous agent and what is trying to be 
optimized by the agent. The reward is defined over a transition ​𝓡 (s, a, s’)​, so starting from one 
state ​s​ taking action ​a​ and ending in the resulting state ​s’ ​(eq. 3.2). The reward for any transition 
is equal to the value of any newly compromised machine in the next state ​s’​ minus the cost of 
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action ​a​. So if no machine was compromised, then the reward is simply the cost of the action 
performed. With this reward function, the goal of the attacker becomes to try and compromise all 
machines with positive value on the network while minimizing the number or cost of actions 
used. This mimics a real world nefarious attacker, whos goal we assume is to to retrieve 
privileged information or gain privileged access on the system. Using the NAS it is possible to 
set these goals by changing the value of certain machines on the network, so for example 
machines that may contain sensitive documents or contain privileged control on the network. 
 
𝓡 (s’, a, s) = value(s’, s) - cost(a)            (3.2) 
 
Where, ​value(s’, s)​ returns the value of any newly compromised machines in ​s’​ from ​s​ or 0 if no 
new machines were compromised and ​cost(a) ​returns the cost of action ​a. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.8 | Example state transition​​ following a successful exploit launched against the http service 
on machine (3, 0). 
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Transition function 
The transition function, ​𝓣,​ determines how the environment evolves over time as actions are 
performed. For the NAS the next state depends on whether an action was successful or not, 
which in turn depends on a number of factors. Specifically, whether the action target is 
reachable, whether the action is a scan or exploit, if traffic is allowed for the target service 
between a compromised machine and the target (i.e. if target is on seperate subnet), whether the 
target machine is running target service and finally, for non-deterministic exploits, the success 
probability of the exploit being used. Figure 3.2.8 shows an example transition, where an 
attacker successfully exploits the ​http​ service on the machine at address ​(3, 0)​. The new state 
represents this success through machine ​(3, 0)​ having its compromised flag set to ​true​.  
 
3.3 Implementation 
 
The goals of the NAS are to be fast, easy to install and able to be used for fast prototyping of AI 
agents. To help meet these goals the program was written entirely using the Python programming 
language (Python Software Foundation, ​www.python.org​) and popular well-supported open 
source libraries. Specifically, the libraries used were numPy for fast array based computation and 
Matplotlib and NetworkX for rendering ​[33]–[35]​. It would have been possible to build a faster 
simulator using a lower-level language such as C++, however another reason to use Python was 
it’s popularity for machine learning research and its well-supported deep learning libraries such 
as Tensorflow ​[36]​ and Keras ​[37]​ that are commonly used for developing reinforcement 
learning agents such as the one used in the next chapter of this thesis. Please see Appendix A for 
details on and for access to source code for this project.  
A diagram of the NAS architecture is shown in figure 3.3.1. There are a number of 
different modules which handle the network model, MDP and other functions with the main 
component being the Environment module. The Environment module is the main interaction 
point for an agent and has four main functions: load, reset, step and render.  
The load function loads a new environment scenario either by generating a network from 
a standard formula or loading a network from a configuration file (more details of each are 
provided in the following section).  
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Figure 3.3.1 | Network Attack Simulator program architecture 
 
The reset function sets the environment to its initial state and returns the starting state to 
the agent and is synonymous with starting a new attack on the network. The initial state is where 
the agent has not compromised any machines on the network, only networks connected to 
external network are reachable and no information is known about services running on any 
machines on the network. An example network and it’s associated initial state is shown in figure 
3.3.2. 
The step function is the main interaction point for an agent with the environment. It takes 
an action and performs the transition given the the current state of the simulator and returns the 
next state, reward for performing the action and whether the goal has been reached. A typical 
cycle of training or testing of an autonomous agent involves: i) resetting the NAS to get the start 
state, ii) using the state to choose an action, iii) executing the action against the environment 
using the step function to receiving the next state and reward, iv) repeat steps (ii) and (iii) until 
the goal is reached or the time limit expires. This complete cycle would be a single episode and 
an agent may then reset the environment and repeat this for as many episodes as desired.  
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Figure 3.3.2 | Example network and initial state​​, where the network contains three exploitable services: 
ftp, ssh and http.  
 
 
The render function provides a number of ways to visualize the environment and network 
and also an attack episode on the network. The first option is to simply render the network as a 
graph, where each vertices is a machine in the network and machines on the same subnet are 
grouped together, while edges are connections between each machine within a subnet and 
between subnets (fig. 3.3.3). This option allows the user to visualize the topology of the network. 
The second option allows the user to visualize how the state of the network changes over the 
course of an attack episode (fig. 3.3.4). This mode shows the state of the network, along with the 
action and reward received for each step and can be used to visualize the attack policy of an 
agent and identify exploited services along the attack path.  
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Figure 3.3.3 |​​ ​Simulator rendering output of example network in figure 3.2.1.​​ Each node represents a 
machine on the network, which machines clustered by subnet. Each edge between nodes with the same 
subnet ID represents connectivity within a subnet, while edges between nodes with different subnet ID 
represent inter-subnet connectivity. Pink nodes are the goal machines that contain “sensitive documents”, 
red and pink nodes both represent machines that are not reachable by agent, blue nodes represent 
machines reachable by agent and the black node represents the position of the agent.  
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Figure 3.3.4 | An example episode rendered using the Network Attack Simulator.​​ The episode shows 
each timestep from start (t = 0) till the end of the attack (t = 4), showing the action performed and reward 
received. The different node colours represent changing states of machines on the network.  
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Configuring a new environment 
The simulator is capable of running any arbitrary network structure as defined by the user in a 
configuration file. A custom network is defined by the tuple: {s​ubnets, topology, sensitive 
machines, services, service exploits, machine configurations, firewalls​}. Table 3.3.1 provides a 
description of each required parameter and figure 3.3.5 shows an example file. The configuration 
files are written using the YAML ain’t markup language (YAML, ​http://yaml.org/​) since it is 
easy to read, write and well supported by Python. 
 
Table 3.3.1 | Description of parameters required for defining a custom network  
Parameter Description 
subnets The number and size of each subnet 
topology  Connectivity of each subnet defined using an adjacency matrix 
sensitive machines The address and value of each sensitive machine on the network  
services The number of possible services running on any given machine 
service exploits The cost and success probability of each service exploit 
machine configurations Which services are running on each machine in the network 
firewalls Which service traffic is permitted along each subnet connection on 
network 
 
 
Generating an environment 
In order to allow for rapid testing of agents on different sized networks and include a standard 
network topology that can be utilized as a benchmark for researchers to compare agents 
performance, we included the option to automatically generate a network for a given number of 
machines, ​M​, and services, ​E​. The generated network is based on the network description first 
developed by Sarraute et al ​[12]​ for testing the performance of POMDP agents and which was 
subsequently used by Backes et al ​[38]​.  
The network is divided into three main subnetworks: i) the demilitarized zone (DMZ), ii) 
the sensitive subnet and the iii) user subnetworks (fig. 3.3.6). The ​M​ machines are divided into 
each subnet as follows, one machine in each of the DMZ and sensitive subnets and the remaining 
M​ - 2 machines in the user subnetworks which are connected in a binary tree structure with a 
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max of five machines per user subnet and connections only between parent and child nodes in 
the tree. The DMZ, sensitive and root user subnets are all connected, and the DMZ is connected 
to the external network. There are network contains two sensitive machines to reach; one located 
in the sensitive subnet and the other on in a leaf subnet of the user tree.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.5 | Example network configuration file and generated network topology.​​ The file is 
defined using YAML 
 
The distribution of configurations of each machine in the network are generated using a 
Nested Dirichlet Process, so that across the network machines will have correlated 
configurations (i.e. certain services/configurations will be more common across machines on the 
network) ​[38]​. This is used in order to more accurately model the correlation of machine 
configurations seen in real-world networks, where most machines on a network will be running 
the same services.  
The success probabilities of each exploit can be chosen, however, the default is to 
randomly sample probabilities from a distribution based on the attack complexity score 
distribution of the top 10 most common exploits used in 2017 ​[39]​. The attack complexity score 
is a metric generated by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and is used to 
reflect how hard it is to find an exploitable machine along with the success probability and the 
skill required to use a given exploit ​[40]​. Specifically, the probabilities were chosen based on the 
attack complexity score for CVSSv2, which scores exploits as having either ‘low’, ‘medium’ or 
‘high’ attack complexity ​[41]​. We take the same approach as Backes et al ​[38]​ and set 
probability of success to be 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 for ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ attack complexity 
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respectively. Using this approach we hope to try and model the distribution of exploit success 
probabilities found in the real world. 
Finally, firewalls exist between each subnet on the network. The firewalls between user 
subnets permit all traffic while the permitted services for each firewall along connections 
between the DMZ, sensitive and root user subnets are chosen at random, but in such a way that 
there is always at least one service that can be exploited on at least one machine for any given 
subnet from any connected subnet. Permitted services are similarly chosen for the connection 
between the external network and the DMZ. Additionally, it possible to set the restrictiveness of 
the firewalls which limits the max number of services that are allowed for any given firewall so a 
user can model a more or less regulated network. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.6 |​​ ​Example generated network with M = 15 
 
3.4 Results 
 
In this section we provide the results of some experiments run on the NAS to test its performance 
and scaling properties. The metrics used were actions per second and load time and we measured 
these versus the number of machines and services on the network. All experiments were 
conducted using a single core on a personal laptop computer running the Linux Ubuntu 18.04 
operating system.  The test machine​ ​​was running an Intel Core i7 7th Gen CPU at 2.7 GHz and 
had 16GB of RAM.  
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Load time of the NAS was measure for a range of machine from 10 to 1000 and a range 
of services from 10 to 1000. Figure 3.4.1 shows the mean load time for the NAS versus the 
number of machines and services. For mean load time, the minimum time was 0.0007 ± 0.00007 
sec (mean ± standard deviation) found in the smallest simulator size tested with 10 machines and 
10 services and the maximum time was was 3.557 ± 0.06 sec and was for the largest simulator 
size of 1000 machines and 1000 services. 
For comparison the load time of a single VM was also measured. We used Oracle VM 
VirtualBox virtualization software ​[42]​ running the linux based Metasploitable 2 operating 
system ​[43]​ as the test VM.  Mean load time for a single machine with no GUI (headless mode) 
was 0.249 ± 0.023 sec, averaged over 10 runs. This load time is over 300 times larger than 
loading 10 machines and services in the NAS. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.1 | Network Attack Simulator load times versus number of machines and services.​​ Times 
were the average of 10 different runs for each tested pair of machines and services, using different 
random seeds. 
 
To test the scaling properties of the simulator during regular use we measured the number 
of actions per second versus NAS size. We ran experiments on simulators using a range of 
machines (10 to 480) and services (10 to 480) and measured the actions per second and averaged 
this over a number of runs (fig. 3.4.2). For the mean actions per second of the settings tested, the 
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minimum was 17329 ± 1907 actions per second for the simulator with 480 machines and 10 
services, while the maximum was 126383 ± 3843 actions per second for the simulator with 10 
machines and 30 services.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.2 | Scaling performance of Network Attack Simulator​​ in terms of mean actions per second 
versus the number of machines and services. Results are averaged over 10 runs with 10,000 actions per 
run, using deterministic actions. Actions performed are selected from action space in sequence, to try and 
keep consistency across runs. The left figure shows performance versus number of machines for networks 
running 10, 240 and 480 services. The right figure shows performance versus number of services for 
networks with 10, 240 and 480 machines. In both figure the red ‘All’ line is averaged over all values of 
services (left) or machines (right) tested.  
 
As a comparison, we measured the mean time required to perform a scan and an exploit 
between two VMs. We used one attacker VM running Kali Linux (​https://www.kali.org/​) and 
one vulnerable VM running the Metasploitable OS. We used a standard Nmap scan of a single 
port, specifically port 21 which was running the ftp service, while the exploit used was for a 
backdoor in version 2.3.4 of the VSFTPD ftp server 
(​https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17491/​) run using the Metasploit framework. The mean 
time required for the Nmap scan was 0.253 ± 0.03 sec, averaged over 10 executions. This is 
equivalent to approximately 4 actions per second. It was not possible to get an exact measure of 
time required for performing the exploit, as it was being used from within the Metasploit 
framework, however based on external timing (using a stopwatch) the time required from when 
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the exploit was launched until a shell was opened on the vulnerable machine was between 3 and 
5 seconds, or roughly 0.2 to 0.3 actions per second. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
The aim for this part of the study was to design and build a fast and easy to install simulator for 
automated pentesting. The implementation of the NAS which only requires the Python 
programming language and common open source libraries is easy to deploy and fast, when 
compared with using VMs. In this section, we further discuss the performance, advantages and 
disadvantages of the simulator in context with other options that currently exist.  
We measured the performance of the simulator in regards to two metrics: load time and 
time taken to perform an action (i.e. actions per second). In terms of load time, the average time 
required increased linearly with the number of machines and number of services present in the 
network (fig 3.4.1). In terms of practical use, for worst case where there was 1000 machines and 
1000 services the load time was approximately 3.5 sec which is many orders of magnitude lower 
than the time that an agent would spend training on the environment and so would not be a 
bottleneck in terms of time. Additionally, when compared with the load time of a single VM, 
which was roughly 0.25 seconds to launch the VM and would require additional time for the OS 
to load, the NAS is significantly faster. The benefits of this rapid load time, means it is possible 
to gather more training data faster which will speed up training time for interactive agents such 
as RL. 
The time required to perform an action was measured using actions per second (fig 
3.4.2). Performance decreased as the number of machines in the network increased, which is 
expected due to the state space growing with the number of machines and the simulator having to 
check more machines and also generate a larger state as the number of machines grows. 
Conversely, performance improves with the number of services when the number of machines in 
the network is larger. After further investigation this is mainly due to there being a much smaller 
number of successful exploit actions when the number of services increases, with successful 
exploits requiring an update to the state and so requiring more time to process. Based off of this 
the performance expected would be less than reported assuming the agents are performing a 
higher proportion of successful actions. In practical terms, the worst case performance of the 
simulator sizes tested was around 17,000 actions per second for a network with 480 machines 
and running 10 services, which is orders of magnitude faster than using a VM network which 
performed could perform roughly 4 Nmap scan actions and 0.3 exploit actions per second for a 
simple network of two VMs. For AI algorithms which rely on interaction with the environment 
for learning an attack path, such as RL, the speed in which these interactions occur has 
significant impact on how fast they are able to generate a useful attack plan. For these algorithms 
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the speed of the NAS compared with what might be expected from a VM will be a great benefit 
when designing these algorithms. 
Currently, there do exist fast higher fidelity network simulators that make use of 
lightweight virtualizations. Most of these simulators are currently applicable only for modelling 
network traffic (e.g. NS3 ​[30]​ and mininet ​[31]​). In terms of simulating pentesting, the Core 
Insight simulator ​[32]​ is a great example of what is possible, offering a higher fidelity 
lightweight virtualized network system. As mentioned previously, this system however requires 
a commercial licence and quite expensive. But even ignoring the price tag, the higher fidelity 
also means more information is required to configure the simulator, so there is some loss in 
versatility. One advantage of the NAS over these kinds of lightweight virtualizations is its ability 
to model arbitrary services and exploits and generate networks of any size. This comparison 
between higher fidelity simulator and the more abstract simpler NAS presents a trade-off 
between fidelity and versatility. Obviously, higher fidelity is key when it comes to applying 
technologies to a real-world setting, however during the early stage of development it is useful to 
have a versatile simulator especially when designing interactive AI agents.  
  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Overall, the presented NAS offers an easy to deploy, fast and flexible penetration testing testbed 
for developing automated agents. The main weakness of this approach is it’s fidelity to a real 
environment which contains much more complexity in terms of the exploits, services, machine 
configurations and network dynamics, however it offers an abstract environment that has a 
number of use cases. Specifically, for rapid prototyping of agent design, in terms of representing 
state, action and reward and handling and learning of the world dynamics. Also for investigating 
the performance properties of algorithms as network topology and size changes. As a next step it 
will be necessary to develop higher fidelity systems to further test and develop autonomous 
agents before they can be used in real world applications.  
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Chapter 4 
Penetration Testing using 
Reinforcement Learning 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The second part of this research aims to investigate the use of Reinforcement Learning (RL) for 
automated pentesting. RL is a field of study as well as a class of solution methods for learning 
the mapping from states to actions in order to maximize a reward ​[14]​. In RL there is an 
environment and an agent who interacts with the environment with the aim of learning the 
optimal actions to take from each state. There are four main components of a RL system, other 
than the environment and agent, these are the policy​ ​π, the reward function​, 𝓡(s’, a, s), ​the value 
function​,​ ​V(s), ​and optionally the model of the environment, ​𝓣 ​ ​[14]​. The policy is a mapping 
from the state space, ​𝓢 ​, to the action space, ​𝓐 ​. We want the agent to find the optimal policy π* 
that chooses the action, ​a​, from any state, ​s​, that maximizes the total expected discounted reward. 
The reward defines the immediate reward for the current state and is sent by the environment on 
each time step. The value function specifies the value of a state over the long run, such that the 
value of a state, ​s​, (i.e. ​V(s)​) is the total accumulated reward the agent can expect to receive in 
the long term starting from that state. The model of an environment is something that tells the 
agent something about how the environment will behave and allows the agent to make 
inferences. The transition model, ​𝓣 (s’, s, a)​ is an example of a model, since it gives the agent 
information about the expected future state given the current state and chosen action. In RL when 
a model is present it is know as ​model-based ​RL, while if no model is present then it is 
model-free​ RL. Model-based problems are typically solved using planning while model-free 
problems must rely on trial-and-error in order to find the optimal policy for the environment. 
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So far there has been no published applications of RL to automated penetration testing. 
One of the main advantages of using a RL approach is that it allows us to approach the problem 
with no assumed prior knowledge, or model, about the action outcome probabilities for any 
given state and instead allows these to be learned by the agent. This provides a solution to one of 
the challenges of automated pentesting which is producing and maintaining an up-to-date 
accurate model of the exploit outcomes. The fast evolving and diverse nature of software 
systems and exploits means in order to produce an accurate model it would be necessary to test 
any exploit on a wide range of systems and repeat this process over time. Using RL on the other 
hand, requires only a definition the state representation, the set of actions an agent can take and a 
reward function. The agent then explicitly learns the model of the environment through 
interaction. This means that as the cyber security space evolves it would only be necessary to 
update the actions that an agent can take and leave the modelling to the agent.  
Over the years many different RL algorithms have been developed ​[14]​. For this study 
we will be using Q-learning which is a RL algorithm for learning an optimal policy in a 
model-free problem ​[44]​. It relies on using experience to learn the Q-value function, ​Q(s, a)​, 
which tells the agent the expected reward if they perform action ​a​ from state ​s​. It has been 
proven that given enough time and exploration of the environment this algorithm will converge 
on the optimal Q-values for each state and action pair. Once the Q-value function converges we 
can then use it to determine the optimal action for a state simply by choosing the action with the 
highest Q-value and hence use it to find the optimal policy for a given environment. 
RL is a powerful and versatile approach for solving MDPs however it can be harder to 
implement and performance can be variable depending on the rate of convergence of the value 
function. This difficulty may be one of the key reasons it has not yet been utilized in automated 
pentesting. This study aims to investigate the applicability of RL to the penetration testing 
domain. We do this by first modelling penetration testing as an MDP where the transition model 
𝓣 is unknown and then using RL in a simulated environment to generate attack policies.  
In the following section, 4.2, we provide some more details about RL as it applies to this 
study, then in section 4.3 we frame automated pentesting as an RL problem using a MDP. In 
section 4.4 and 4.5 we use the network attack simulator (NAS) we developed to test the 
capabilities of RL in terms of whether it is capable of finding an attack path in an network 
environment, how optimal is the attack path, scaling performance and generality.  Finally, 
section 4.6 provides a discussion of the experimental results and section 4.7 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
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4.2 Background 
 
RL algorithms learn optimal policies through interaction with the environment. This done by 
starting from some initial, typically random, policy then iteratively learning the values of taking 
a certain action for a given state, ​Q(s, a),​ by choosing an action based on the current policy, 
applying that action to the environment, then updating the state-action value, ​Q(s, a)​, based on 
the received experience (fig. 4.2.1) ​[14]​. Specific RL algorithms differ based on how they choose 
actions, update their value estimates for the value function and the form of the value function. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1 | The Reinforcement learning cycle. 
 
There are a number of different action selection strategies available but two of the most 
commonly used, and the ones used for this study, are ε-greedy and upper confidence bound 
(UCB) action selection ​[14], [45]​. Both these strategies aim to balance exploration versus 
exploitation. The ε-greedy action selection strategy does this by choosing a random action with ε 
probability, and choosing the current best action the rest of the time (eq. 4.1). This forces the 
agent to randomly explore actions that it does not think are valuable given the current 
experience. It is common to implement ε-greedy along with ε-decay which decreases the value of 
ε over time so that as the agents estimates of action values improve it chooses random actions 
less frequently. UCB action selection, on the other hand, uses an extra exploration term when 
doing action selection (eq. 4.2). This extra term increases the value of actions that have been 
taken less frequently and acts to measure the uncertainty of action value estimates. For this study 
we implement algorithms that make use of both these action selection methods in order to have a 
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comparison and investigate how action selection might affect the use of RL in automated 
pentesting. 
 
 
(4.1)  
    
(4.2) 
 
We make use of Q-learning in our RL implementations for the value update strategy. 
Q-learning is an off-policy temporal-difference algorithm for learning the action-state values and 
is defined by the update function in equation (4.3) ​[44]​. ​Where α is the step size, which controls 
how much to move current estimate towards the new estimate and 𝛾 is the discount factor which 
controls how much to weight immediate versus future rewards. Q-learning has been shown to 
converge to the optimal state-action values, as the number of visits to state-action pair 
approaches ∞.  
 
   ​     (4.3)(S , ) (S , ) Q t At ← Q t At + α R max Q(S , ) (S , )[ t+1 + γ a t+1 a − Q t At ]  
 
The final key aspect of RL algorithms that differs between implementations is what form 
the value function, ​Q(s, a),​ takes. There are two main options: i) ​tabular​ and ii) ​function 
approximation ​[14]​.​ Tabular methods use a table like data-structure to store the state-action 
value for each state-action pair with pairs being updated as the agent receives experience.  
Function approximation methods, on the other hand, use a function to generate the state-action 
values and update the parameters of the function to improve these estimates as the agent gains 
more experience. In this study we implement both tabular and function approximation methods 
to investigate how both these methods perform when applied to network pentesting.  
 Tabular methods have the advantage that they are simple to implement and can often 
find exact optimal solutions. Their use, however, is limited to problems with relatively small 
state sizes since each state-action pair must be stored. They also treat each state independently 
and so cannot make use of knowledge learned about different but similar states to generalize to 
unseen states.  
Function approximation methods on the other hand can be used with arbitrarily large 
state spaces and are capable to generate to unseen states. However, they are more complicated to 
implement, requiring the use of an extra function to approximate the value function with 
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performance strongly affected by the function representation used. There are many options for 
how to represent the function, however the method gaining most attention recently and for which 
the biggest RL improvements have been seen in recent years has been the using of deep neural 
networks ​[15], [46]​. The combination of using Q-learning and neural networks for function 
approximation is known as Deep Q-learning and has been used to produce state of the art results 
in a number of environments including the game of Go and on many Atari video games ​[15], 
[46]​. As such it has been shown to be a powerful algorithm when dealing with large state spaces. 
 
4.3 Penetration testing using Reinforcement learning 
 
In order to use model-free RL for Automated Pentesting we need to frame the problem as an 
MDP leaving the model unknown. As discussed previously, an MDP is defined by the tuple {​𝓢, 
𝓐, 𝓡, 𝓣}​. We represent states, actions and reward as presented in Chapter 3, with states being 
the status and configuration knowledge of the agent for each machine on the network, actions as 
the available scans and exploits for each machine and reward given by the value of newly 
compromised machines minus the cost of action (fig. 4.2.1). The transition model,​ 𝓣,​ is of course 
unknown.  
 
Table 4.2.1 |​​ ​​Reinforcement learning MDP definition,​​ where​ |M|​ represents the number of machines on 
the network and ​|E|​ represents the number of exploitable services. 
Component Definition 
𝓢 
|M| x {compromised} x {reachable} x |E| x {machine service knowledge} 
 
Where:  
       compromised ∊ {true, false} 
       reachable ∊ {true, false} 
       Machine service knowledge ∊ {absent, present, unknown} 
𝓐 |M| x {scan, exploit} x |E| 
𝓡 (s’, a, s) value(s’, s) - cost(a) 
𝓣 (s’, a, s) unknown 
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Since this is a primary investigation into the use of RL for pentesting, we use one key 
assumption: the agent has complete knowledge of the network topology. This means the agent 
knows the address of each machine on the network and their connectivity. This assumption is 
made in most attack planning approaches, and is based on the availability of the topology data 
from a client requesting a penetration testing assessment ​[13]​. This assumption could be relaxed 
in principle, but would mean the state representation vector would change over time since we 
would not know beforehand how many machines are on the network and so the size of a state 
would grow as more machines are discovered. Applying RL to problems where the state 
representation is dynamic is much more difficult and the vast majority of work into RL involves 
stationary state representations. For this reason we believe it is better to have this assumption at 
this early stage of the research and then if RL proves promising, perhaps attempt to apply it with 
no knowledge of the network topology and mimic exactly the point of view of a real attacker.  
Reinforcement learning algorithms 
As there are currently no studies investigation the use of RL for automated pentesting we 
decided to implement a range of RL algorithms. Specifically, we make use of three different 
Q-learning algorithms: tabular Q-learning using ε-greedy action selection (tabular ε-greedy), 
tabular Q-learning using UCB action selection (tabular UCB) and deep Q-learning using a single 
layer neural network and ε-greedy action selection (DQL). These algorithms were chosen as they 
provide both tabular and function approximation RL implementations, while using tabular UCB 
also provides the opportunity to investigate how action selection strategy affects performance in 
the pentesting domain. 
The algorithms implemented for tabular ε-greedy and tabular UCB are presented in 
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively. These are standard implementations of Q-learning 
based on work presented in Sutton and Barto ​[14]​. The action-value function is stored using a 
hashmap with states as keys and action-values as values. The key difference between the two 
tabular implementations is the action selection method along with the use of an extra data 
structure to store visit counts for each state-action pair in the tabular UCB implementation. 
Otherwise the algorithms are the same. 
 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We implemented the DQL using experience replay and a seperate target neural network, 
as first presented by Mnih et al. ​[27]​. The full algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3. This 
algorithm was chosen compared with the original DQL approach, which used only a single 
neural network, as it had improved performance in terms of learning rate and stability ​[27], [46]​. 
We use a  fully-connected single layer neural network for both the main and target neural 
networks, which takes a state vector as input and outputs the predicted value for each action (fig 
4.3.1). The state vector is an ordered array of information for each machine on the network, 
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while the output is an ordered array of values for each scan and exploit for each machine on the 
network. We utilize ε-greedy action selection for the DQL algorithm so that for a given state, the 
next action is chosen by selecting the action with the highest predicted value with probability 1 - 
ε, and a random action uniformly at random with ε probability. 
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Figure 4.3.1 | Schematic illustration of the Deep Q-network.​​ Input layer is a state represented by a 1D 
vector of information for each machine in network. The single hidden layer is fully connected to both 
input and output layers. The output layer is the action value for each scan and exploit for all machines in 
network. 
 
4.4 Experiments 
 
This study aimed to investigate the application of RL to Automated Penetration Testing. The 
main questions we wanted to answer were: 
 
1) Can RL be used to find an attack path through a network when one exists? 
2) How optimal is the attack path generated by the RL agent, as defined by the reward 
function? 
3) How does RL scale with increased network size and number of exploits? 
4) How general is the RL approach? Does it work on different network configurations? 
5) How do the different RL approaches compare? 
  
For (1) an attack path, means the agent is able to learn a policy that is capable of reliably 
exploiting the sensitive machines on the network. For the case of our experiments (2) will be 
optimizing over the action cost. As discussed in chapter 3, action cost can be used to represent 
any desired property of an exploit, e.g. time required, monetary cost or chance of detection. For 
(3) network size means the number of machines, |M|. on the network. It is worth noting that both 
the state and action space grow with ​|M|​ and the number of exploitable services, ​|E|​, so 
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increasing ​|M|​ or ​|E| ​increases the problem size for the RL agent. However, they both don’t 
affect the dynamics of the system the same so it was important we investigated how performance 
was affected by both increasing ​|M| ​and​ |E|. 
We investigated the performance of each RL algorithm by measuring performance on a 
range of scenarios. The general experimental procedure was to choose a scenario (i.e. network 
size, topology, number of services, etc..), train the agent for a set period of time and then 
evaluate the final policy generated by the agent. The following sections describe each of these 
steps in detail. 
Experiment scenarios 
We tested the different RL algorithms on a number of different network scenarios using the NAS 
we developed. In particular we used three different computer network designs: i) the standard 
network described in chapter 3 ii) single site network and iii) multi-site wide-area network. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to find specific case study network designs to use for our 
scenarios apart from the standard network design which was based on practical commercial 
experience of the Sarraute et al. ​[12]​. We therefore, designed the other two scenarios to represent 
a simple single location network and a multi-location network of the same size. 
The standard network design is shown in figure 4.4.1 and described in detail in chapter 3. 
This architecture has been used in previous studies testing automated pentesting agents in 
simulated environments ​[11], [12], [38]​. This design acts as a real-world scenario as well as a 
means of comparison. Additionally, the NAS supports generation of random scenarios using this 
design based on the number of machines and number of exploits. We use this feature when 
investigating the scaling properties of the different RL algorithms. 
The single site and multi-site network scenarios are shown in figure 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. All 
three network scenarios contain 16 machines, five exploitable services and two sensitive 
machines. This was chosen so we could investigate the effect of different network architectures 
on the RL algorithm performance. Similarly, all scenarios require a minimum of three machines 
to be exploited in order to gain access to all the sensitive documents and complete the scenario.  
The three fixed scenarios described are used to test questions (1), (2), (4) and (5) outlined 
at the start of this section. In order to investigate question (3) as well as (1) and (5), we tested the 
RL algorithms against the standard generated network scenarios while varying either the number 
of machines in the network and using a constant number of exploitable services or varying the 
number of exploitable services and keeping the number of machines constant . 
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Figure 4.4.1​​ | ​The standard network scenario.​​ Labels beneath each machine indicate, the exploitable 
services running on that machine. Labels along edge to firewall from subnet indicates exploitable service 
traffic allowed through firewall. Documents above a machine indicate a valuable machine. 
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Figure 4.4.2​​ | ​The single site network scenario​​ (see figure 4.4.1 for diagram information). 
 
For each scenario we tried to keep as many settings as consistent as possible, to better 
elucidate the effect of the variable of interest. Table 4.4.1, provides details of the different 
parameter values used. The max steps value chosen as this tended to give good performance 
across a range of scenario sizes during preliminary testing. Similarly for the values of sensitive 
machines and action costs.  
 
Table 4.4.1​​ | ​Experiment scenario parameters and their values 
Parameter Value Description 
Max steps 500 Maximum number of steps allowed per 
episode, before environment is reset to 
start state 
Exploit cost 1 Cost of performing each exploit action 
Scan cost  1 Cost of performing a scan action 
Sensitive machine value 10 Reward received when sensitive 
machine is exploited 
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Figure 4.4.3​​ | ​The multi-site network scenario​​ (see figure 4.4.1 for diagram information). 
 
Training details 
For each scenario we trained each agent for two minutes before evaluating the learned 
policy. We chose to train the agents for a set time period since the time per step of the tabular 
agents is significantly faster than the DQL algorithms and since, in practical terms, if applying 
RL in a commercial setting we would be most interested in how long it takes an agent to find an 
attack path in terms of time compared to training episodes. The time limit of two minutes was 
chosen for practical reasons, as it allowed a large enough variety of scenarios to be tested and 
solved while still being short enough to not make running of many experiments too time 
consuming. 
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Each algorithm required the selection of a number of hyperparameter values. The values 
chosen are shown in table 4.4.2. Hyperparameters selection was done using a mixture of 
informal search on different size standard generated networks, selecting default choices from the 
machine learning library used ​[37]​ and values seen in literature for DQL ​[27]​. For tabular 
𝜺-greedy and DQL we also used 𝜺-decay, which acts to reduce 𝜺, and hence the probability of 
choosing a random action, over time from the initial value, 𝜺​max​, to the final value, 𝜺 ​min​ (1.0 and 
0.05, respectively for both Tabular 𝜺-greedy and DQL algorithms) (eq. 4.4). 
 
 
ε ) eεt = εmin + ( max − εmin −λt                              ​(4.4)  
  
 
 
Table 4.4.2​​ | ​List of hyperparameters used for each algorithm and their values 
Hyperparameter Tabular 𝜀-greedy Tabular UCB Deep Q-learning 
Step size, 𝛼 0.1 0.1 - 
Discount factor, 𝛾 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Initial 𝜀 value, 𝜀 ​max 1.0 - 1.0 
Final 𝜀 value, 𝜀 ​min  0.05 - 0.05 
𝜀 decay rate, 𝜆 0.0001 - 0.0001 
Confidence, ​c - 0.5 - 
Minibatch size - - 32 
Hidden layer size - - 256 
Replay memory size - - 10 000 
Target network update 
frequency 
- - 1000 steps 
RMSprop learning rate - - 0.00025 
RMSprop gradient 
momentum 
- - 0.9 
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Evaluation procedure 
Following training the agents performance was evaluated by running its trained policy against 
the network scenario in the NAS either 10 or 30 times depending on the experiment. The policy 
was tested using 𝜺-greedy action selection with 𝜺 = 0.05, so to avoid the chance of the agent 
getting stuck in a state forever and to avoid overfitting of the policy to the scenario. For 
comparison, where applicable, we also used a random agent which selected actions uniformly at 
random in each state. 
For the custom scenarios used (standard, single site and multi-site), we trained the agent 
once against each scenario and then ran 30 evaluations of the trained agent. For the experiments 
where we generated scenarios using the NAS, we did 10 separate runs for each scenario using a 
different random seed each run and evaluated each of the runs 10 times. We chose to generate 
multiple versions of the same scenario since performance varied significantly depending on the 
generated configurations, even for the same network topology. This is due to differences in the 
number of exploitable services available on any given machine and also the exploit probabilities, 
since both these factors were randomly generated.  
Experiment setup 
All experiments were conducted on single core on a personal laptop computer running the Linux 
Ubuntu 18.04 operating system.  The test machine​ ​​was running an Intel Core i7 7th Gen CPU at 
2.7 GHz and  had 16GB of RAM. All RL algorithms were implemented in the Python 3 
programming language (Python Software Foundation, ​www.python.org​) and popular 
well-supported open source libraries. Specifically, the libraries used were numPy ​[33]​ for fast 
array based computation and Pandas ​[47]​ and Matplotlib ​[34]​ for handling and rendering of 
results. For the DQL algorithm we utilized the Keras Neural Network library ​[37]​, running on 
the TensorFlow library backend ​[36]​. All Neural Network computation was done using a CPU 
only, with no GPU acceleration. Please see Appendix A for details on and access to source code 
for this project.  
 
4.5 Results 
Custom Scenarios 
For each of the different constructed network scenarios: i) standard ii) single site and iii) 
multi-site, we measured the episodic reward during training as well as final performance of the 
trained policy of each RL algorithm. Figure 4.5.1 shows the mean episodic reward versus the 
training episode. We averaged the reward over the last 100 episodes, in order to produce a 
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smoother reward signal. All three algorithms converged on the approximate optimal solution 
within the training time limit, shown in the plots by the convergence of mean episodic reward to 
the theoretical max (red dashed line). The theoretical max is based on deterministic exploits and 
is the total value of the sensitive machines minus the total cost of the minimum number of 
exploits required to compromise them from the starting state. For the single-site and standard 
network scenarios, convergence occurred after a similar number of episodes for all three 
algorithms (~1000 episodes for single site and ~ 150 episodes for standard network). For the 
multi-site network scenario, the DQL algorithm converged significantly faster, after ~100 
episodes compared with >1000 episodes for the two tabular algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 4.5.1 | Mean episodic reward versus training episode​​ for the different RL algorithms and 
scenarios tested. The dotted red line represents the theoretical max reward obtainable for each scenario. 
The mean episodic reward is smoothed by averaging over last 100 episodes. 
 
62 
 
 
 
We also compared the mean episodic reward over time for the different RL algorithms 
(fig. 4.5.2). As opposed to reward versus episode where DQL tended to learn faster, the two 
tabular algorithms converged to the approximate optimal solution significantly faster than DQL 
in terms of time. For the single-site and standard network scenarios, the tabular methods 
converged in <10 seconds, while DQL took ~50 seconds for the standard network and ~75 
seconds for the single-site network. For the multi-site network scenario, convergence time was 
more similar with all algorithms converging in <25 seconds, however DQL was still the slowest 
by ~5 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 4.5.2 | Mean episodic reward versus training time ​​(seconds) for the different RL agents and 
scenarios tested. The dotted red line represents the theoretical max reward obtainable for each scenario. 
The mean episodic reward is smoothed by averaging over last 100 episodes. 
 
63 
 
 
 
This difference in convergence time is likely related to the time each algorithm takes to 
complete an episode. To measure this we recorded the number of training episodes completed by 
each algorithm within the two minute training period (table 4.5.1). The tabular methods were 
significantly faster than the DQL algorithm, with Tabular 𝜺-greedy performing 50 times more 
episodes than DQL in the worst case and Tabular UCB performing 37 times more episodes than 
DQL in the worst case. This difference is expected due to the additional computation required for 
the DQL Neural Network computations. The increased speed of the Tabular methods makes up 
for the slower learning rate per episode and still allows for them to have optimal performance in 
the tested scenarios. 
 
 
Table 4.5.1 | Number of training episodes for each Reinforcement Learning algorithm and scenario​​, 
during two minute training period. 
Scenario Tabular ε-greedy Tabular UCB Deep Q-Learning 
Standard 240 999 196 728 3959 
Single-site 265 642  242 598 4016 
Multi-site 234 042 171 942 4636 
 
 
Following the two minute training period for each RL algorithm on each scenario we 
measured the performance of the final trained policies using ε-greedy action selection with ε = 
0.05. We recorded the proportion of the 30 evaluation runs which were solved by the agent, 
where a run was considered solved when the agent successfully exploited the sensitive machines 
on the network within the step limit (500 steps). We also recorded the maximum reward 
achieved by the agent for each scenario along with the variance in reward over the 30 evaluation 
runs. Performance of a random policy was also measured for comparison. 
The results of the trained agent evaluations are shown in figure 4.5.3 and recorded in 
table 4.5.2. All three algorithms and the random policy were able to solve each scenario on at 
least some of the runs, with the three RL agents performing significantly better than random on 
the multi-site and standard network scenarios. For the single-site network scenario, the Tabular 
ε-greedy agent actually performed worse than the random agent (0.9 vs 0.97 respectively) while 
the Tabular UCB and DQL algorithms performed equally as good or better. The worse 
performance of Tabular ε-greedy is likely due to the ε-greedy action selection in the policy 
evaluation causing the agent to get stuck in a state not usually encountered along it’s normal 
trajectory to the goal. Additionally, the performance of the random agent is very high for this 
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scenario, due to its simplicity compared with the other scenarios. The only algorithm able to 
solve 100% of all evaluation runs was the DQL algorithm. 
All algorithms were able to achieve an approximately optimal max reward for each 
scenario as shown by the plot of max reward in figure 4.5.3. The random agent was able to solve 
each scenario however it took significantly more actions each time, as shown by negative max 
reward achieved. The performance of the DQL algorithm was the most consistent across the 
different scenarios, likely attributable to the better generalization of it’s policy to unseen states 
and states not along the optimal attack path.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5.3 | Evaluation performance of Reinforcement Learning algorithms for each scenario. 
Solved proportion (left), shows proportion of 30 evaluation runs solved. The (right) plot shows the max 
reward achieved from the 30 evaluation runs, with error bars showing mean standard error of rewards.  
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Table 4.5.2 | Solve proportion and max reward achieved for each scenario​​ and reinforcement learning 
algorithm following training. Solved proportion is top number while max reward (± mean standard error) 
is the lower number in each row. 
Scenario Random Tabular ε-greedy Tabular UCB 
Deep 
Q-Learning 
Multi-site 0.53 -177 (± 18.94) 
1.0 
15 (± 0.38) 
0.97 
15 (± 16.77) 
1.0 
16 (± 0.30) 
Single-site 0.97 -49 (± 24.92) 
0.9 
16 (± 28.64) 
0.97 
17 (± 17.18) 
1.0 
17 (± 0.24) 
Standard 0.4 -98 (± 25.45) 
1.0 
16 (± 0.32) 
0.97 
16 (± 16.82) 
1.0 
16 (± 0.3) 
 
 
Scaling 
We measured the scaling performance of each algorithm in terms of network size and number of 
exploits. We measured the effects of both using the standard generated network of the NAS. For 
each network scenario we tested 10 different random configurations and then measured 
performance on each configuration following two minutes training using 10 evaluation runs with 
ε-greedy action selection with ε = 0.05. We measured performance using two metrics. First was 
mean solved proportion, which was an average of the proportions of evaluation runs solved for 
each different configuration, where a network was solved when all sensitive machines were 
exploited within the step limit of 500. The second metric was mean reward, which was the 
average over runs of the reward achieved during evaluation runs. We also evaluated a random 
policy for a comparison. 
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Figure 4.5.4 | Reinforcement Learning algorithm performance versus number of machines​​ in 
auto-generated standard networks with number of exploitable services fixed at 5. For each network size 
tested, performance was averaged over 10 evaluation runs of trained agents using an ε-greedy policy with 
ε = 0.05 for 10 different runs for each scenario, where machine configurations change between runs. The 
shaded areas show mean standard error. 
 
 
The effect of network size was tested by increasing the number of machines on the 
network from 3 to 43 machines in intervals of 5, while keeping the number of exploitable 
services fixed at 5. Figure 4.5.4 shows the results of the experiments. Performance was equal and 
better than a random policy for all three algorithms up to networks containing 18 machines. For 
the tested networks with more than 18 machines, performance of DQL and Tabular UCB 
algorithms declined rapidly, although both algorithms were still able solve more than 50% of 
scenarios for networks with 23 and 28 machines with mean reward performance still better than 
random. Performance for Tabular ε-greedy was consistently high for network up to and including 
33 machines, after which performance rapidly dropped to worse than random for networks with 
43 machines. 
We measured the effect of increasing the number of exploits available to the agents by 
using a fixed size network of 18 machines and increasing the exploitable services available from 
1 to 51 in intervals of 5. The results of the experiment is shown in figure 4.5.5. The effect of 
increased number of exploits differed for each algorithm. Performance was relatively unaffected 
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for the Tabular ε-greedy, which maintained near optimal performance for all numbers of exploits 
tested. Similarly, Tabular UCB, had lower than optimal performance, but performance remained 
relatively consistent as the number of exploits increased. The most affected was DQL which had 
performance comparable with random for all values tested (we leave discussion of why this may 
have been the case to the next section).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5.5 | Reinforcement Learning algorithm performance versus number of exploitable 
services​​ in auto-generated standard networks with number of machines in network fixed at 18. For each 
network setting tested, performance was averaged over 10 evaluation runs of trained agents using an 
ε-greedy policy with ε = 0.05 for 10 different runs for each scenario, where machine configurations 
change between runs. The shaded areas show mean standard error. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
This aim of this study was to investigate the application of RL to pentesting. We did this by 
developing and testing a number of RL algorithms using the NAS we developed. In order to 
assess the applicability of RL we broke the problem down into five avenues of investigation. 
Specifically: 
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1) Can RL be used to find an attack path through a network when one exists? 
2) How optimal is the attack path generated by the RL agent, as defined by the reward 
function? 
3) How does RL scale with increased network size and number of exploits? 
4) How general is the RL approach? Does it work on different network configurations? 
5) How do the different RL approaches compare? 
 
We aimed to answer questions (1), (2) and (4) by constructing some custom scenarios 
and then measuring the performance of the attack policies generated by trained RL agents in 
those scenarios. The scenarios are shown in figures 4.4.1-3, while the results of our experiments 
are shown in 4.5.1-3 and tables 4.5.1-2. For each scenario all RL algorithms tested were able to 
find an attack policy that lead to all sensitive machines on the target network being 
compromised, while also minimizing the number of actions taken, performing significantly 
better than a random policy in terms of max reward achieved. Based on these results, within the 
simulated environment RL is able to find a valid attack path (1) that is also optimal in the reward 
achieved and hence action cost (2) and is also able to be applied to different network 
configurations (4).  
Although these results provide promising evidence for the use of RL in automated 
pentesting, it is worth noting some limitations of the experiments. In particular, the scenarios 
were were limited to networks containing 16 machines with five exploitable services and so the 
were is relatively small in size compared with large commercial networks of hundreds of 
machines that can be found in real-world settings. However, along these lines, the agents were 
only allowed two minutes of training with the slowest time to convergence being roughly 80 
seconds for the DQL algorithm (fig. 4.5.2). It would therefore be expected that the RL agents 
could be applied to larger problem sizes given more training time. Another limitation is that we 
only tested three different network topologies, while the possible topologies encountered in the 
real-world are endless. One of the key advantages of RL is its generality, as demonstrated by its 
success in achieving human-level or better performance across a wide range of very distinct 
games using a single algorithm design ​[27], [46]​. Based on this fact it would be expected that RL 
would be able to generalize to other network topologies, since for the RL algorithms the 
difference in underlying problem structure and complexity between different network topologies 
is relatively small, the key difference comes in the difference in size of the networks.  
To investigate how RL performance differed with problem size we looked at the 
scalability of RL (3). The scalability of the different RL algorithms was measured both in terms 
of number of machines on the network (fig. 4.5.4) and also the number of exploits available to 
the agent (fig. 4.5.5). We found that for all the algorithms tested their performance dropped 
rapidly beyond a certain network size (18 machines for Tabular UCB and DQL, and 38 for 
Tabular ε-greedy). The drop in performance is expected since for the pentesting problem, how 
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we have defined it, the size of the state space grows exponentially with the number of machines 
on the network (eq. 3.1) while the training time was kept constant at two minutes. For larger 
networks, increasing training time would likely lead to improved performance, at least up to a 
point. Performance of Tabular RL algorithms is known to suffer when the state space grows 
really large since they do not generalize action-values between similar states ​[14]​. This can be 
seen in the steep drop in performance to below that of a random policy of the Tabular RL 
algorithms for networks with 43 machines (fig 4.5.4), while the DQL algorithm is still able to 
outperform a random policy for this size network. It would be expected using DQL or related 
function-approximation approaches to RL it should be possible to scale up these algorithms to 
deal with much larger networks given enough training time. As an example of the scalability of 
DQL approaches, the AlphaGo RL agent is able to find better than human level performance in a 
game with a state space of around 10​174​ states ​[15]​.  
Another approach to handling the exponential increase in the state space size would be to 
decompose the problem into two seperate agents. One agent would work at the network topology 
level, deciding which machine to target next, while the second agent works at the individual 
machine level, deciding which exploits to use against a given machine. This approach has been 
shown to work well for model-based automated pentesting using POMDPs ​[12]​. One promising 
approach for model-free automated pentesting would be the use of hierarchical RL, which is a 
technique that can be applied to MDP to decompose actions into different levels of abstractions, 
however this is still an area of active research in the RL domain and so it may be some time 
before it becomes a reliable and efficient method ​[48]​. Between the possibility of scaling up RL 
via more efficient function-approximation methods or via problem decomposition, it is possible 
to imagine RL being applied to very large networks.  
Apart from large network size, another of the challenges facing pentesting is the 
complexity and rapid evolution of the services present on a given system and the set of exploits 
available. Every year new exploits are found for software and so in order to be useful automated 
pentesting agents will need to be able to handle a large growing database of exploits. We 
investigated the performance of RL algorithms as the number of available exploits increased (fig. 
4.5.5). We found that the performance of the tabular RL algorithms were relatively unaffected by 
increased number of exploits, with the Tabular 𝜺-greedy algorithm maintaining near optimal 
performance and solving almost 100% of every scenario configuration tested. On the other hand 
the performance of DQL was not much better than a random policy.  
The reasoning for this reduced performance in DQL with increasing number of exploits 
we believe is due to two reasons. Firstly, increasing the number of actions increases the size of 
the neural network used by the DQL algorithm, which slows down the number of operations per 
second and hence the number of steps the algorithm can perform within the two minute training 
period. This is coupled with the fact the state space grows as the number of exploits increases, so 
slower exploration with a larger space to explore, means the agent cannot explore sufficiently to 
find the optimal attack plan within the time limit. The second key reason is that unlike states 
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which the neural network is able to generalize well, since as the state space grows so does the 
number of very similar states as many machines on the network can be ignored as they are not 
along the optimal path. However, as the number of exploits increases, so do the number of state 
possibilities along the optimal path since the branching factor for each machine grows with the 
number of exploits. Decomposing the automated penetration testing problem into a higher level 
topology agent and a machine exploiting agent would help alleviate this problem, since then 
adding a new exploit would only mean a single increase in state space size for the machine level 
agent, rather than an exponential increase as is the case with the current design. 
Based on these scaling experiments, it would appear that the approach used in this study 
would not scale well to large networks and number of exploits. The Tabular RL algorithms are 
able to scale well with the number of actions, while not being able to scale to networks with 
many machines. Conversely, it may be possible to scale the DQL algorithm to larger networks 
given more training time and using more advanced algorithms, however this approach does not 
scale well with increased number of actions.  In terms of action selection strategy, 𝜺-greedy 
action selection learned faster, produced better policies for the majority of scenarios tested and 
scaled significantly better than UCB for the tabular algorithms, so is a clear choice for future 
research and application.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This study was a preliminary investigation into the application of RL to pentesting. We 
demonstrated that in a simulated environment it is possible to use RL to generate a policy that is 
capable of successfully and optimally exploiting a target network. Taking this a step further, it 
would be possible to use the policy information to determine which components of a network 
need patching and then repeat the process in order to improve the security of a network. The key 
advantage of using RL over other AI planning techniques, is that it requires no prior knowledge 
of the transition model of the exploits and network and so is very general in its application, with 
the same algorithm able to be applied to different network topologies and configurations with 
varying number of exploits available. 
Although RL will be a powerful tool for many domains as technology improves, for 
automated pentesting there are still a number of hurdles to overcome. In particular, scaling the 
algorithms with the number of machines on the network and also with the number of exploits 
available to the agents. Further work into developing more efficient algorithms or decomposing 
the pentesting problem will help greatly to solve these issues.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
5.1 Summary and conclusions 
 
In this project we wanted to investigate solutions for the challenging problem of 
cybersecurity, in particular the growing shortage of skilled professionals. As with many 
industries, automation is an obvious choice for a solution when tackling a skills shortage. We 
aimed to worked on applying the AI approach of RL to automating network pentesting. This 
involved two stages, the first of which was to design and build a NAS that could be used to 
design and test automated pentesting agents in a fast easy to use environment. The second stage 
was to utilize the NAS to study the application of RL algorithms to automated pentesting. 
The main finding of this work, was that within a simulated environment it is possible for 
RL algorithms to find optimal attack paths through a target computer network. We were able to 
successfully apply RL to a range of network topologies and configurations with the only prior 
knowledge being the topology of the network and the set of available scans and exploits. This 
offers a key advantage over current approaches to automated pentesting which rely on having an 
accurate model of the exploit outcomes, which is hard to produce in the rapidly evolving cyber 
security landscape. However, we also found that the RL algorithms we implemented are limited 
in their applicability to relatively small networks and number of exploits. Additionally, RL relies 
heavily on having a high-fidelity simulator for training agents before they are capable of being 
used in a real-world scenario.  
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5.2 Possible future work 
 
This study aimed to be a preliminary study into using RL for automated pentesting and as 
such has lead to many more interesting problems to solve before this technology may be 
practically used in a commercial environment. Firstly, we need to develop more scalable RL 
algorithms that are able to scale to the size of modern large networks while also handling 
hundreds if not thousands of possible exploits. The next step after that will be to apply these 
algorithms in more realistic environments such as VM networks using information from real 
organizational networks in order to determine how they can be applied in real-world settings.  
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Appendix A 
Program listing 
 
 
All the source code and results for this project can be found at the github repo: 
https://github.com/Jjschwartz/NetworkAttackSimulator​. 
 
The code for this project is all written in Python 3 and is split into a number of separate modules. 
The main modules are the Environment, the Agents and the Experiments. There is also a module 
for generating a POMDP file, however this was not used for the work covered in this thesis and 
so is ignored for the sake of clarity.  
  
75 
 
 
 
A.1 Environment 
This module contains all the code for the Network Attack Simulator. The program architecture is 
shown in figure 3.3.1 in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Table A1 provides a list of each file in the 
module and a description of its role in the Network Attack Simulator. 
 
 
 Table A1 | Files and description in the program Environment module. 
File Description 
action.py Contains the Action class which defines an action in the NAS 
environment.py The main class for the NAS. It controls the network attack model and provides the main function with which to interact with the NAS 
generator.py Contains all the functionality for automatically generating a network configuration given the number of machines and services to run.  
loader.py Contains all functionality for loading a custom network configuration from a .yaml file 
machine.py Contains the Machine class which defines a machine in the network model 
network.py The network model class, which defines and controls the behaviour and configuration of the network in the NAS 
render.py Contains functionality for rendering the environment and episodes  
state.py Contains the State class which defines a state in the NAS 
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A.2 Agents 
 
This module contains all the different Q-learning agents that were implemented for this project. 
Table A2 provides a description of all files in this module. 
 
 
 Table A2 | Files and description in the program Agent module. 
File Description 
agent.py Contains the abstract Agent class which all RL agents inherit from 
dqn.py Contains the Deep Q-Learning agent class 
q_learning.py Contains the Tabular Q-learning agents (both 𝜺-greedy and UCB)  
random.py Contains the Random agent 
tabular.py Contains the abstract TabularAgent class which the Tabular Q-learning agents inherit from 
tuner.py Contains some functionality for performing hyperparameter search on the different agents 
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A.3 Experiments 
 
This module contains all the different scripts used to run the experiments on the RL agents and 
NAS. Table A3 provides a description of all files in this module. 
 
 
 Table A3 | Files and description in the program Experiment module. 
File Description 
agent_perf_eval_plotter.py 
Contains functionality for summarizing and displaying the 
results generating by evaluating trained agents 
using agent_perf_exp.py 
agent_perf_exp.py Runs performance and scaling experiments on RL agents.  
agent_perf_plotter.py Contains functionality for plotting episodic performance of RL agents 
agent_scaling_plotter.py Contains functionality for plotting the scaling performance of RL agents 
env_perf_exp.py Contains some functionality for testing the running performance of the NAS  
env_perf_plotter.py Functionality for plotting the results of experiments run on NAS 
experiment_util.py Contains functionality for loading scenarios and agents common across different experiments 
results/ Contains the main result files from the study 
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